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coverage to China and India; Latin 
America and Africa also get attention� 
However, the theme of these sections 
seems to be impact rather than influ-
ence, and while that focus makes sense 
for the argument he wants to make, 
it does seem to divert attention away 
from more-significant developments�
The individuals most responsible 
for moving the Cold War away from 
dangerous confrontation were Richard 
M� Nixon and Leonid I� Brezhnev� Both 
wanted détente, but for different reasons� 
Westad argues that this period was 
basically a truce� In many ways, détente 
turned out to be much better for the 
United States� The competition did not 
go away, but it turned to soft power, in 
which global trends ended up favoring 
capitalism and the United States� Nixon 
also managed to turn China into an ally 
during this period� Westad argues that 
this development occurred more because 
of the incompetence of Mao Zedong as a 
statesman than Nixon’s skills as a strate-
gist� Mao had weakened China, and his 
policies often brought about situations 
that were exactly the opposite of what 
he wanted� Rejecting the argument of 
most historians, Westad argues that the 
Americans rather than the Soviets killed 
détente, mostly because of American 
domestic politics� These arguments 
are well sustained, and although many 
might have trouble accepting these 
contentions, they are basically correct�
Why did the Cold War end with a U�S� 
victory? “Like its enemy, the United 
States had its portion of Cold War 
successes and failures� It is just that 
the balance sheet came out differently, 
and better, than that of the other side” 
(p� 620)� The assets that worked to the 
advantage of the United States included 
long-term alliances, economic growth 
and transformations, technological 
change, and diplomatic skill�
This book is hardly the last word on the 
Cold War; given its significance, the 
period will be studied for decades to 
come� But Westad has given his readers 
an important, thought-provoking 
account, and that is no small thing�
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
 
Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Co-
operation with Russia and China, 1945–2016, by 
David F� Winkler� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2017� 336 pages� $31�95�
In the summer of 1988, I stepped aboard 
USS Yorktown (CG 48) as a young 
midshipman during my orientation 
cruise and noticed a ship silhouette 
painted on the bridge wing� When 
members of my class inquired about 
its meaning, the crew regaled us with 
the story of the shouldering incident 
with the Russian frigate Bezzaventnyy 
just a few months earlier in the Black 
Sea—the incident pictured on the cover 
of David F� Winkler’s recently updated 
Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation 
and Cooperation with Russia and China, 
1945–2016� Winkler began studying 
the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention 
of Incidents on and over the High Seas 
(also known as the Incidents at Sea 
Agreement, or INCSEA) after experienc-
ing such events firsthand as a junior 
officer in the Sea of Japan in the mid-
1980s� Since then, he has established 
himself as an authority on the subject at 
the Naval Historical Foundation� With 
a foreword by the chief U�S� negotiator 
of INCSEA, former Secretary of the 
Navy John W� Warner, this edition of 
Winkler’s book builds on the original 
(published in 2000) by addressing the 
expanding influence of China and 
the resurgence of Russia as global 
competitors in the maritime domain�
Winter2019Review.indb   165 12/4/18   11:13 AM
1
McGrath and Winkler: Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Cooperation with Rus
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 1 6 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Incidents at Sea takes a chronological 
approach to the intricate relationship 
between the American and Russian 
navies beginning at the end of World 
War II, through the growth of the Soviet 
navy, into the post–Cold War tensions 
with Russia, to the emergence of China 
as a global maritime force� Drawing 
from oral histories and extensive 
personal interviews, Winkler puts a 
human face on these interactions by 
relating the experiences of junior officers 
aboard USN ships, senior naval leaders, 
and senior government officials� He also 
provides intimate details about the inter-
actions of the members of the American 
delegation with their Soviet counterparts 
during the initial INCSEA negotiation 
and subsequent annual reviews�
No single event precipitated this un-
precedented agreement; instead a series 
of dangerous, and sometimes deadly, 
interactions between the two nations’ 
navies and air forces reached a tipping 
point in 1971, resulting in a Soviet call 
for action� American naval leaders had 
sought such an agreement in the decade 
prior, but senior State Department 
officials were wary that these discussions 
might derail ongoing American efforts 
regarding territorial sea claims� Given 
assurances from the Russians that this 
would be a navy-only discussion, the 
State Department acquiesced, and 
then–Under Secretary of the Navy 
Warner headed the U�S� negotiating 
team for initial talks� After months of 
preparation, the American delegation 
went to Moscow in October 1971, and 
the resulting agreement included all the 
points it desired� A follow-on meeting in 
Washington, DC, in March 1972 ironed 
out remaining details, and Secretary 
Warner signed the INCSEA agreement 
with the Soviet navy’s commander in 
chief, Fleet Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, 
on May 25, 1972, at President Richard 
M� Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid 
I� Brezhnev’s Moscow summit�
INCSEA marked the first formal 
interaction between the two superpow-
ers� Discussions involved more than just 
negotiating sessions; they also included a 
social agenda, with each side showcasing 
the strengths of its culture and economy� 
Winkler presents the social agenda 
as a key element in the breakdown of 
barriers between the two ideologically 
different sets of participants� Another 
key to INCSEA’s success was its bilateral 
and navy-to-navy nature� Limiting the 
scope of the agreement created more 
common ground for the two parties� 
Winkler notes something I also have 
observed in bilateral navy staff talks: 
naval officers have a common shared 
experience of operating at sea that 
cuts across the politics of nations�
Since the signing of the historic agree-
ment, U�S�-Russian relations have ebbed 
and flowed, but INCSEA remains a 
stalwart of international agreement and 
cooperation� Winkler illustrates how—
despite other sources of tension between 
the two countries—both sides have 
maintained civility during the annual 
INCSEA reviews� He also describes sev-
eral tense international situations during 
which following INCSEA protocols kept 
a cold war from turning hot� Yet despite 
its success, INCSEA has not prevented 
all unsafe interactions at sea—witness 
the Bezzaventnyy-Yorktown incident 
in February 1988� More recently, since 
the Russian resurgence under President 
Vladimir Putin, the number of incidents 
between the two nations has increased, 
especially as American warships and 
aircraft reassert the right to navigate 
freely in the Black and Baltic Seas�
The growth of the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army Navy in the 1990s 
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brought increased interaction with 
American warships, naval auxiliaries, 
and military aircraft, reminiscent of 
the Cold War� The United States and 
China signed the Military Maritime 
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in 
1998, modeled after INCSEA� Winkler 
notes, however, that the MMCA lacks 
the level of trust established between 
the Soviet and American navies, and 
therefore has been less effective�
The high seas and contested littorals 
were the front line of U�S�-Soviet interac-
tion during the Cold War� Winkler’s 
book provides an intimate look at 
the development and execution of a 
landmark agreement between adversar-
ies that provided a key mechanism 
for ensuring that their interaction at 
sea remained professional and kept 
the Cold War from becoming hot�
JAMES P� MCGRATH III
The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945, by Da-
vid Hobbs� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2015� 480 pages� $59�95�
This work is the latest in a series 
of books from this author about 
Royal Navy aircraft carriers, and British 
carrier aviation in particular� It takes 
the story forward from where his last 
work on the British Pacific Fleet left 
us—in the misty waters of Tokyo Bay 
in September 1945� Hobbs shows how 
the ethos of naval strike warfare that 
had been developed and honed in the 
rigors of World War II survived the 
many and varied challenges that the 
postwar era threw at it� Most obviously, 
perhaps, it is a study of naval retrench-
ment under that most demanding of 
scenarios: demobilization after a world 
war coupled with a broader and ongoing 
retreat from global preeminence� It is 
no surprise, then, that budgetary issues 
take center stage, but Hobbs manages 
to make his account much more than 
a mere litany of what might have been� 
He charts moments of gritty determina-
tion and ingenuity mixed with some 
unforgivable and almost criminal areas 
of waste and abuse—features that are 
certainly familiar to anyone involved in 
military planning� Above all, though, 
an unswerving belief from within the 
service about the value of its aviation has 
allowed the capability to be resurrected 
almost from the dead in recent years, 
in the form of two large carriers with 
real strike capability� This fact alone 
makes this book a compelling read�
It is difficult to imagine a more qualified 
individual than Hobbs to guide us 
through this story� After a thirty-year 
naval career as an aviator that spanned 
the last years of the “big deck” carriers, 
the “through-deck” cruiser era, and 
right up to the “renaissance” after the 
Falklands War, Hobbs capped this off 
with a period working in naval records 
and as the curator of the Fleet Air Arm 
Museum� This gave him almost unparal-
leled access to the necessary archival 
material, a resource he has used to 
great effect in this volume� The book is 
nothing short of exacting in its research�
That said, and although he tries valiantly 
to hide it, Hobbs clearly has a message 
he is anxious to communicate� It is, as he 
freely admits, “in part my own story” (p� 
vii)� His thesis, which he openly reveals 
in the last few pages, is that Britain 
would have been better served had it 
continued to replace its strike carriers 
from the 1960s onward� While an un-
derstandable and legitimate viewpoint, 
it is just that—a viewpoint—and many 
will bemoan this lack of objectivity, 
particularly as the broader constraints 
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